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THE PROBLEM OF
UNITY OF WORLD COMMUNISM

THE

Communist party was conceived by Lenin as a
highly centralized organization of full-time professional conspirators, "no less professionally trained than the police," but
more militant, completely dedicated to the objectives of the
Party, as well as highly specialized in a variety of revolutionary
activities. 1 The apex of the Party's organizational structure was
to consist of a " dozen" tried and talented leaders "working in
perfect harmony ..." 2 who would "appoint bodies of leaders
for each town district, for each factory district, and for each
educational institution." 3 Lenin expected that such a monolithic system would provide solidarity, stability, and continuity
of leadership, would enjoy the confidence of the masses, and
would enable him to overthrow Czardom and to seize power.
He said:
The fundamental question of revolution is the question of power~
[and] a Communist party will be able to perform its duty only
if it is organized in the most centralized manner, only if iron
discipline prevails in it, and if its Party center is a powerful and
authoritative organ, wielding wide powers . . .5

When the Bolsheviks did seize power, they organized the
new regime according to the same\.authoritarian and monol~thic
'V. I. Lenin, Collected Works (New York: 1929), IV, 201.
2 Ibid., p. 194, 196.
a / bid., p. 200.
• Quoted by Joseph Stalin, Foundat.ions of L eninism (New York: 1939), p. 48.
5 V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, X, 204.
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principles which prevailed in the Party. Lenin also stated at
that time that if Czarist Russia was ruled by 200,000 members
of the nobility there was no reason why the Soviet Russia could
not be ruled by 200,000 Bolsheviks.
In 1919, Lenin conceived an organization of tbe world
Communist movement along the same principles and with headquarters in Moscow. The objective of this organization was the
establishment of a monolithic Communist dictatorship on a
world scale. Accordingly, each local Communist patty, in
order to be a member of the Communist International, had to
lose its autonomy and submit to the dictates received from the
headquar1ers in Moscow where the Comintem had constituted
itself as the "general staff" of the world revolution. Various
sections of the International (local pa11ies) , themselves monolithically organized, were bound by the strictest discipline,
forming a world-wide front, directed from one center, in a life
and death struggle against the non-Communist world. 6 The base
of this world revolution was the Soviet Union, and the members of the Communist Pai1ies, as well as the working class of
the whole world, were to look at the Soviet Union as their
only fatherland. The Soviet Union, to whom they owed their
primary loyalty, was to be defended by these world-wide masses
against any attack, including attack on the part of one's own
country.7
Soviet control of the Communist International found its
clearest expression in the organization and powers of the Executive Committee of the International which elected a smaller
o See Th e Th eses and Statutes of the Communist l nternalional, Second World Congress, July 17-August 7, 1920, Moscow; parLicularly " Conditions of Admission to the Communist International." See also Program of the Communist
International, adopted by tl1e Sixth World Congress, September 1st, 1928,
Moscow, particularly "The Fundamental Tasks of Communist Strategy and
Tactics."
, Ibid., parLicularly "The Significance o( U.S.S.R. and Her World Revolutionary
Duties."
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body known as the Presidium of the Executive Committee. The
Presidium in turn elected from among its members the Political
Committee. And it was the Political Committee ( which was com•
posed of Moscow-oriented members) that had concentrated in
its hands all the power of the International.8 In this manner,
the International Communist movement became a tool in the
hands of the Kremlin which used the Communist International
to promote the interests of the Soviet Union.
Lenin was not without precedent in his image of Moscow
as the ideological and political headqua11ers of a universal
state. The ideology of Slavophilism which conceived Moscow as
the Third Rome, as the center of a universal religion and of a
world-wide state should not have been alien to him. It was, how•
ever, Stalin, a Georgian, who for reasons of personal power,
as well as for reasons of promoting and strengthening a worldwide Communist movement, that had elaborated a theoretical
justification of a world Communist monolith of charismatic
character, centered in Moscow. Stalin stated that the intensity
of internal contradictions in Czarist Russia, the ability and the
revolutionary attitude of the Russian people ( said to be "the
most revolutionary in the world"), gave birth to Leninism,
which in turn was responsible for the first proletarian revolution
and for the formation of the "Fatherland of Socialism." Lenin
thus became the leader not only of the Russian but of the inter•
national proletariat, according to Stalin.9
Considering himself as Lenin's rightful successor, Stalin
unde11ook to Stalinize the Communist parties the world over.
Stalin had realized that it was the intellectuals in the leader•
ships of various Communist parties who tended to identify
!bid., "Constitution and Rules of the Cotmnunist International, The Executive
Committee," points 14, 15, 19, 22, 25.
0 Joseph Stalin, Foundations of Leninism, op. cit., pp. 10, 15-19. Concerning the
background of the ideology of a Moscow-centered world-wide state, see D.
Tomasic, The Impact of Russian Culture on Soviet Communism (Glencoe:
1953).
8
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themselves with the national interests of their own countries
rnther than with those of the Soviet Union. Hence, in search
for more compliant leadership, Stalin undertook to substitute
the intellectuals in Party leadership by people of working class
oi-igin, without formal education, but outstandjng for their ability, militancy, discipline, fanatic dedication to the Communist
cause, and personal loyalty to Stalin. And it was such a thoroughly indoctrinated and Moscow-oriented group of leaders in
the world Communist movement-people who were able to follow Kremlin orders unquestioningly and with deep conviction
in the rightfulness of Stalin's policies- that were of considerable help to the Soviet Union in promoting its global interests
before and after World War II. The territorial expansion of the
Soviet Union and the formation of its satellite empire during
this period would have been inconceivable without such a system
of monolithism which Stalin had characterized as "complete and
absolute unity of will and action.mo
The claim to lead all newly formed Communist states and
the whole world Communist movement was now justified by the
Kremlin not only on the basis of Russia's unique revolutionary
experience, but also on the basis of the Soviet Union's achievement in expanding proletai-ian revolution, in building Socialism,
and 1.n developing it toward Communism. The Soviet Union was
said to be an advanced Socialist country while other Communist ruled countries- the "People's Democracies"-were said
to be on a lower stage of Socialist development.
Before World War II, the monolithic control system cen•
tered in Moscow was not based only on the rules of the Comintern. At that time Moscow's hold had much deeper roots.
Moscow's overlordship then was ingrained in the innermost
feelings and yearnings of hundreds of thousands of idealistic
and Utopia-seeking Communists the world over, in their quasi10

Joseph Stalin, Foundations of Leninism, op. cit., pp. 119-20.
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religious conviction that Russia was fighting for the salvation
of all downtrodden, all humiliated and oppressed. Such an identification with Russia fostered endurance of hardships, dedication to the cause, sufferance of imprisonment and torture, and
even acceptance of death resignedly. Such a faith in the Fatherland of Socialism strengthened discipline and made many Party
members ready to accept dictates from Moscow, and its frequent
shifting of the "Party Line" as well as expulsions and executions of one's leaders, associates, and close friends; even when
such an action seemed to be unfair on the basis of known circumstances.11
After World War II, however, such emotional ties to
Moscow began to weaken. The Utopia-seeking Party members
or sympathizers who had heretofore idealized the Communist
system from a safe distance were now confronted with Communist reality which had a shocking effect on their feelings and
attitudes. At the same time the power-oriented fanatics who
rose to the Party leadership in the course of the Communist
underground struggle soon realized that their vested interests-

the acquired power and prestige-were not identical with those
of the KTemlin leaders, particularly when Stalin began to enforce changes in the leadership of the local Parties and install
in power those whom he considered to be the safest instruments
of Moscow (the "Muscovites") . In such a situation the th1·eatened Party leaders (the " homegrown" Communists) were quick
to appeal to the general public, pointing out that the "national
interests" of the country were at stake.
And it was in this dilemma of personal and national versus
Soviet interests that the Kremlin leaders had lost the most bindi ng ground of monolithism. It was due to this loss of emotional
6es and of internationalist orientation that the Red Army had
11

See, for instance, the official biography of Josi£ Broz Ti1n, as 1old by Ti10 in
Vladimir Dedier, Tito (New York: 1953), p. 49.
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to he stationed in the Communist-ruled countries of Eastern
Eurnpe in order to support the governments headed by Moscowappointed and Moscow-dependent Communists.12
For the same reason wherever the Soviet Union failed to
maintain large contingents of Soviet armed forces, such as in
Yugoslavia, Albania, and China, the local Communist leaders
were enabled to consolidate their power internally as well as
build a vested interest in their own brand of Communist revolution which eventually was to come into conflict with Soviet type
Communism. The question arose lo whom a good Communist
owes his primary loyalty, to his own Party, its leaders and its
vested interests, or to the Kremlin, to his own country, or to the
oviet Union. This dilemma was closely related to the prol,lem
of who was entitled to define and to interpret the interests of
the world Communist movement and the sacred texts of Leninism, the Kremlin, or an assembly of all Communist patties in
a common consensus based on equal vote. It was such a question
and conflict of vested interests that struck at the heart of monolithjsm after World War II and brought about open rebellion
against Moscow in Yugoslavia, Poland, and Hungary, and more
recently in China and Albania.

II
For an analysis of the problem of conflict and unit in the
Communist world, the case of Yugoslavia is particularly signjficant. That is, the history of Soviet-Yugoslav relations indicates that a rebellion against the Russian type of monolithism
does not necessarily annul the imperative need for Communist
unity in regard to the non-Communist world. When the Communist party of Yugoslavia was formed in 1920, it identified
•~ See on this point D. A. Tomasic, "The Rumanian Communist Leadership," The
Slavic R eview, (October, 1961) ; also by the same author, "The Political
Leadership in Contemporary P oland," Journal of Hunum Affairs, (Winter,
1961); and " Direccion y Estructura del Poder en Hungaria," Estudios Sabre
el Comm.u11ismo, (October-December, 1961), (Januar y-March, 1962) .
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itself completely with the interests of the Soviet Union. It resolved that it "will always he ready to fight with all its forces
for the Russian proletarian revolution and to give everything
for the defense of that revolution regardless of sacrifices.'"~
However, after the Communist party of Yugoslavia had seized
power and established its contrnl in the country according to
the Soviet model, it began to develop its own sphere of influence
and vested interests and these were not always identical with
those of the Soviet Union.
Thus, for instance, the Yugoslavs were planning lo expand
Lheir power in the form of a Belgrade-centered Balkan FederaLion which was to include Bulgaria, Albania, and eventually
Greece, or at least Greek Macedonia. They put forward claims
on some parts of southern Austria, as well as on the city of
Trieste. Tito made trips to other Communist-ruled countries of
Eastern Europe where he was received with great enthusiasm
by the local Communists. The Yugoslavs claimed that their experiences in building Communism were better suited for Eastern
Europe than Russia's model. And the Communist leaders in
these countries saw in Tito a counterweight to the increasing
pressures from Moscow. All this was a threat to the heretofore
unchallenged authority of the Kremlin and it was this conflict
of Soviet and Yugoslav interests and ambitions that eventually
brought about the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the community
of the Communist nations (Cominform) in 1948.1•
The break with Russia, however, affected adversely the
situation within the Yugoslav Communist party whose members
had been trained for years to regard Russia as the center of
Slav power as well as the source of world Communist inspiration. Demoralization, factionalism, and ideological splits devel1 '1

"Program Komunisticke Partije Jugoslavije," lstorijski Arhi11 Kon11mis/Jckr
Partije Yucoslavije, Belgrade, 1947-1952, Vol. 2, pp. 41.
14
See on this point D. A. Tomasic, National Communism and Soviet Stratecy
(Washington, D. C.: 1957) , Chap. VII.

•

8

Marquette University Slavic Institute Papers

oped within the Party rnnks as well as within the top leadership.
As a result, Western, anti-Communist influences were beginning
to infiltrate the country to an extent that caused worries in the
Party's power:holding circles. Cutting of the umbilical cord to
the main source of Communist energy and morale not only
affected adversely the discipline in the Party but gave rise to
considerable opposition against the Party outside its ranks.
The Party leadership saw in these events a possible prelude to
complete disintegration of the Communist system in Yugoslavia
and to loss of their power ( and lives as well).1 5
Faced with such grim possibilities, the Yugoslav ruling
clique looked for ways to patch up its differences with the
Kremlin, to return to the fold and even to recognize Russia's
leadership, at least formally. In the meantime, significant events
were also taking place in the Soviet Union itself. Stalin was
dead and in the ensuing struggle for power, Nikita Krushchev
was in ascendancy, inaugurating a policy of relaxation in the
rigidity of Kremlin-di1'ected monolithism, as a means to save
it from its ruins. He stated that there were different "national
roads" to Communism and that a ce1tain degree of autonomy
of each Communist country will strengthen rather than weaken
the cause of world Communism. As a result of such rapprochement in views and change in attitudes, declarations were signed
in Belgrade (June 1955) and in Moscow (June 1956) in which
Yugoslavia pledged to follow the Communist line and to sup•
port the Soviet Union in its international policy. Close economic
and cultural cooperation between the two countries was decided
upon and even the prospects of a military agreement were
indicated. Said Tito, "In peace as in war, Yugoslavia must
march shoulder-to-shoulder with the Soviet people toward the
same goal, the goal of the victory of socialism."'0
1"
11;

lbid., Chaps. Vill and IX.
In a speech in Stalingrad as reported by Radio Moscow, Soviet Home Service,
June 11, 1956, and in Borba, Belgrade, June 12, 1956.
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Nevertheless, relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia continued to be strained, mainly because of a high-handed
attitude of the Russians which offended the pride-conscious
Yugoslavs. Thus, the Declaration of the ruling Communist par•
ties in Moscow, 1957, was not signed by Yugoslavia. Moreover,
the Yugoslav Communists, who have often manifested an ambition to play the role of a "Great Power," were confident that
they would be able to form a "third force" of " neutral" countries under Tito's leadership and thus become a leading factor
in international politics and make an ~istorical contribution of
their own to the spread of Communism over the globe. Their
long-range plans of such grandiose proportions included also
the role of chief mediators between the East and the West dui-ing
the period of peaceful coexistence. 17 For such a role of -worldwide significance, tbe Yugoslav Communists needed a platform
which would appeal to the nonaligned, particularly the underdeveloped countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, as well
as to Socialist parties and movements in the West. At the same
time the Yugoslavs wanted to preserve the essential tenets of
Marxism in order not to risk an irreparable break with Moscow.
Accordingly, at the Seventh Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia which met at Ljubljana in 1958, they
adopted a Party Program which ·was to serve these ends.
In underdeveloped countries private native capital tends
to be rather limited compared to state capital. Therefoi-e the
state bureaucracy is particularly powerful in these cotmtries
and is in a key position to effect significant social changes. It
is to these circles that the Ljubljana Program was intended to
appeal. Thus the Program states that "state capitalism" was not
necessarily a "stage" in the capitalist development but could be
the function of a new type of state: a state which is not any
17

For a sociological explanati on of such political ambitions of Yugoslav Corn•
monists see D. A. Tomasic. National Communi,sm, and Soviet Strategy
op. cit., Chaps. IV and VII.

•
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more an exclusive instrument of the bourgeoisie but has acquired an independent role and has placed itself "over and
above society." The bureaucracy in such a state might become
an independent social and political factor free from the pressures of the bourgeoisie. In such a situation, state capitalism,
under certain conditions, might be the first step toward socialism.18 This could be achieved in a gradual way, merely by the
political struggle of "the working class." And in order not to
alienate the entrenched bureaucracies in these countries, the
Ljubljana Program purposely minimizes the "leading role" of
the working class "vanguard"-the Communist party, in the
transformation of society toward socialism :
The conception that the Communist parties have a monopoly over
every aspect of the movement of society toward socialism and
that socialism can find its representatives only in them and move
forward through them, is theoretically wrong and practically very
harmful.10

At the same time, however, the Program of the Communist
League of Yugoslavia support~ Khrushchev's ideas of a "parliamentary road to Communism" and of "buying off" the revo•
lution from capitalists. It supports also the present Soviet concept of "peaceful coexistence." 20 It is intended to be a link
between the Communist Internationalism of the Soviet Union
and local nationalisms of the bureaucracies in the undeFdeveloped countries.
Moreover, as an ideological conflict between Moscow and
Peking began to take a distinct form, the Yugoslavs saw in this
situation, too, a good chance for themselves to play a significant
part on the world stage. Thus, in August, 1960, a series of
articles appeared in Belgrade's Borba, the leading organ of the
16

The Program of the Leagne of Comm.uni.sM of Yngoslavia (Ljubljana: 1958),
Chap. 1.
1 9 Ibid., Chap. Il.
20 Ibid., Chaps. II and 111.

The Problem of Unity of World Commw1is111

11

Yugoslav Communists, in which Russia's position against that of
China was strongly defended. The a1ticles were written by
Edward Kardelj, a ranking member of the Politburo ( Executive
Committee) and official " ideologist" of the Yugoslav party.
Soon after that, during the meeting of the U.N. General Assembly in New York (1960), Tito and Khrushchev made a public
declaration concerning the identity of their views on "basic
issues." How close the two Parties have come to an even closer
understanding is indicated in the new Program of the Communist party of the Soviet Union (1961) in which Yugoslavia
is identified as a country that, like the countries which form the
"Socialist camp," has " likewise taken the Socialist path." ~1
The ideological rapprochement between Belgrade and
Moscow might reflect the similarity in the social structures of
the two countries. Both are ruled by monolithic Communist
parties, and both are governed by a new, well-paid class of
privileged bureaucrats and technocrats. This new "technological
intelligentsia" has developed a vested interest of its own in
contrast to the rest of the population. And it is this class that has
been growing in numbers and importance in all the Communistruled countries. This new class, therefore, is developing an
esprit de corps not only on the local level but on an international
level as well, identifying its interests with the sw·vival of Communist unity on a world scale. Such a class would therefore
tend to exert a conceited pressure on their respective Pa1ty
leaderships to patch up the differences.
In addition, in the case of Yugoslavia, the internal situa•
tion is an important factor which works in the direction of a
pro-Moscow orientation. National rivalries and conflicts in that
zi Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Unio11, adopted at the 22nd Con•
gress of the Party, Moscow, 1961, Part I, Chap. 3. The Central Committee
of the Communist party, of Yugoslavia, at its session of Nov. 27, 1961, in
appreciation for such Soviet treatment of Yugoslavia, bad high praise for
the 22nd Congress of the Soviet party as having made "a very significant
con trihution" to the progress of socialism and peace.

•
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country have been intensified in recent years and even affected
the Communist party's ranks and cadres. The existence of at
least two rival views in the Party has recently been officially
recognized: one demanding more centralization, in favor of
Belgrade, the other more decentralization in favor of national
republics."~ Moscow, from the point of view of its own interests
and experiences is inclined to support a monolithic system in
Yugoslavia centered in Belgrade which would disregard separate interests of various nationalities and would tend to
strengthen Serbian hegemony in the countTy. The Western influences on the other hand tend to encourage claims of various
nationalities for self-asse1tion against de-nationalizing and
hegemonistic monolithism. Thus, the present Serb-dominated
leadership of the Communist party of Yugoslavia is under intense pressure to come closer to Moscow. And in a recent communique issued in Belgrade jointly by the respective ministers
of foreign affairs of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia they "reaffirmed the identity or similarity of views on fundamental
international questions." 23

III
The struggle for power which took place in the Soviet
Union after the death of Stalin and difficulties which developed
IJetween the Kremlin and the Communist states in Eastern
Europe opened an opportunity for the Chinese Communist
leaders to interfere in favor of one or the other Party. Thus,
it is alleged that in the Soviet-Polish clash, the Chinese intervened in favor of Poland while in the Hungarian Revolution
they prevailed on the Soviet leaders to crush the uprising by
armed force.2• The Chinese Communists have also developed a
See Tito's speech at the session of the Central Committee of the League of
Communists of Yugoslavia, November 27, 1961.
2a United Press International's dispatch from Belgrade, April 21, 1962.
~• See on this point G. F. Hudson (ed.), The Sino-Soviet Dispu.te (New York: 1961) .

22

The Problem of Unity of World Communism

13

great pride in their revolution, which they achieved without
Russia's help, and in a way which was contrary to the advice
and directives received from the Kremlin. Hence, considering
themselves at least equal and possibly even superior to the
Russians, the Chinese Communist leaders felt free to criticize
the policies of the Kremlin. They also began to compete with
the Russians in their propaganda endeavors, and even with
economic aid, in various parts of the world, particularly Asia,
Africa, and Latin America.
Conflicts have existed between the two Parties from the
very beginning of the Chinese Communist movement. As early
as the late 1920's disagreements arose between Mao Tse-tung
and Stalin on the question of strategy and tactics of the Communist revolution in China. While Stalin wanted the revolution
to be centered in the urban proletariat, Mao's tactic was to rely
on the peasants. At first Mao Tse-tung was demoted but by the
early 1930's Mao was back in control of the Chinese Communist
pa1ty.25 He led the Party and the peasant army to victory in the
late fo1ties without Russia's help and against seem ingly insurmountable obstacles.
An important circumstance in the present Sino-Soviet con•
flict is that the very same people who had led the Chinese
revolution and had conquered power in China are still ruling
in China today. And they differ considerably from the Russian
l eaders in terms of background and psychological make-up. The
Chinese leaders come mostly from middle class families and
on the whole have had a rather broad education and tend to
be of an intellectual bent. A large part of Chinese top leaders
come from the interior provinces of middle China {particularly
Hunan and Szechuan), from regions which were almost unaffected by the influences of Western civilization and where
25 See

on this point B. I. Schwartz, Chinese Comm-tmi'.sm and the Rise of Mao
(Cambridge: 1951).

•
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rebellious, warlike activities and military vocations have been
a part of the local tradition. 26 As young men these people had
l'evolted against their elders and against some of the old Chinese
2
traditions and-practices in their family and in the community. ;
But as students in high school and at the university they have
been indoctrinated in the ideas of the greatness of China's his•
tory and civilization, which was said to be "older and more
glorious than that of any other country." They have accepted
the nationalistic traditions of the Middle Kingdom which had
expanded over Manchuria1 Turkestan, Mongolia, Korea, For•
mosa, and Tibet, had penetrated Bu1·ma, Nepal, and Annam,
and had looked at the rest of Asia as its own sphere of interest.
Said Mao:
Our nation has a history of several thousand years, a history
which has its own characteristics and is full of treasures . . .
The China today has developed from the China in history ; as we
are believers in the Marxist approach to history, we must not cut
off our whole historical past. We must make a summing-up from
Confucius down to Sun Yat•sen and inherit this precious legacy.
This will help us much in directing the great movement of today.~s

At the same time, however, impressed by the achievements
of Bolshevik Russia they adopted Marxism-Leninism in its
Stalinist form, its ideology as well as its practices, as the best
available psychological and organizational instrument to seize
power and to expand it. Accordingly, the Chinese leaders became professional revolutionaries and conspirators, fanatically
dedicated to the seizure of power and fanatically determined to
z11 According to a personal communication from S. Y. Teng, Professor of Chinese
History, Indiana University. See also Chao Kuo-chun, "Leadership in the
Chinese Communist Party," Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science, (January, 1959), pp. 40-50.
27 See a sample of biographies of Chinese Communist leaders in Nym Wales, Red
Dust (Stanford; 1952).
2s Mao Tse-tung, Selected 117orks (London; 1954), II, 259-60. See also Shen•yu Dai,
"Peking's International Position and the Cold War," Annals of the Amer•
ican Academy of Political and Social Science, op. cit., pp. 112-121.
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further develop China's greatness. And it was their unshakable
belief in China's great destiny and in the inevitability of their
victory that explains, at least partly, their success in overcoming
seemingly insurmountable difficulties in their road to power.
The present top Party leadership in the Soviet Union, on
the other hand, is composed overwhelmingly of leaders of
Russian nationality who had risen to prominence only after the
seizure of power by the Bolsheviks.29 They are "post-revolution"
leaders whose education has been geared by the Pa1ty in the
direction of technical specialization and administrative versa•
tility rather than broad general knowledge. Thus they have gone
through a rather specialized polytechnical training which has
Leen generally below university level. They were picked up
by the Party for their ability and versatility, for activism and
sense of dedication from among the young men of working class
( industrial labor and peasantry) background."0 Hence, being
raised and trained as members of a ruling nation and of an
established class, they tend to be calculating technocrats rather
than fanatic revolutionaries.
This difference in the social background, training, and
psychology of the two leaderships might explain, at least partially, the differences in their "strategy and tactics." Thus, the
Chinese leaders tend to believe in the inevitability of war with
the capitalist world and in the necessity of war to spread Communism. They therefore tend to emphasize revolutionary methods throughout the world regardless of sacrifice in human life
and suffering and believe in the necessity of constant internal
tension to spur action and revolutionary enthusiasm in building
Communism. The Chinese also sponsor the idea that the Soviet
Union should in the first place help the economic and military
growth of other Communist-ruled countries, including the devel29

Biographies of Soviet Leaders, materials collected by Alan Lichtenstein, Indiana
University.
lo Ibid.

•
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opment of nuclear weapons, and thus promote Communist revolution in the rest of the world.
The Soviet leaders on the other hand tend to focus their
interest in the first place on "building Communism in the Soviet
Uuion" under Russian leadership and in expanding Russia's
power and sphere of interest throughout the world by building
a strong Soviet industrial base and military machine. Such a
plan demands a prolonged period of peace, undisturbed by
wars of international character, at least until such a time when
the Soviet Union becomes economically and militarily so overpowering that it can blackmail the rest of the world with the
threat of war and dictate peace on its own terms. The Russian
Communists, therefore, say that th.is is the epoch of building
Socialism and Communism, that the Socialist camp is already
stronger than the capitalist camp and is therefore able to prevent war and to save humanity from nuclear destruction. Hence
they stress the possibility of " peaceful transition from capitalism to Socialism" and claim that "peaceful coexistence" is the
" highest form of class struggle.mi The two contrasting leaderships and opposite policies were therefore bound to come into
conflict.
It appears, m01·eover, that the present Sino-Soviet dispute
is also a continuation of the age-long rivalry between Holy
Russia and the Celestial Empire. The Russian Czardom, taking
advantage of China's weaknesses, has been expanding its power
and conquests into Asia since early in its history. By the middle
of the nineteenth century Russia was able to obtain all the
Chinese territory north of the Amur river as well as the territory east of the Ussuri River where Russia eventually built the
port of Vladivostok (the "Ruler of the East"). By the end of
the nineteenth century Russia obtained permission to carry the
a1 See the dooumenls on ideological differences between Moscow and Peking in

G. F. Hudson (ed.), The Sino-Soviet Disp1tte, op. cit.,
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Trans-Siberian railway directly across Manchuria. Russia also
extended its influence in Korea, occupied Port Arthur and
Dairen, as well as a portion of the Liaotung peninsula, and
claimed all the territory north of the Great Wall. In 1901
Russia dispatched large bodies of troops into Manchuria. Russia's further expansion was checked by Japan in the RussoJapanese war of 1905 in which the Japanese captured Pott
Arthur and drove the Russians out of Manchuria and out of
Sakhalin.
After the Communist seizme of power in Russia in 1917,
the Communist rulers did not give up the traditions of Imperial
Russia, but rather continued in the same footsteps. Thus, basing
their claims on a secret treaty between Czarist Russia and
Japan (1907) which empowered the Russian government to
"lend Mongolia its assistance in order to . . . forbid entry to
Chinese armies and colonization of her lands by the Chinese." 32
The Russian Communists considered that Outer Mongolia fell
within the Soviet sphere of interests. And in order to perpetuate
its control of that country, the Kremlin incited dissension in it.
And when violent anti-Russian revolts broke out (1930-32), the
Red Army quelled them by tanks and planes. Finally a Communist patty securely under a pro-Russian leadership was or•
ganized and has been used ever since as an instrument of Soviet
control. 33
On the other hand, the Chinese Communist leaders who
contrnl Inner Mongolia (inhabited by a numerically larger
number of Mongols than those in Outer Mongolia) and are
motivated by the traditional Chinese claims on the whole of
Asia, have shown a great deal of interest in the fate of their
!l:!

E. B. Price, The Rw;so-Japanese Treaties of 1907-1916 Concerning .Manchur,'.a
and Mongolia (Baltimore: 1933), p. 107.
B. Ballis; " Outer Mongolia: Case Study of Soviet Colonialism," Studies
of the Soviet Union, Vol. l, No. 2, 1%1, Institute for the Study of USSR,
Munich, Germany.

33 William

•

18 Marquette University Slavic Institute Papers
"racial brothers" across the borders. Thus they have been promoting immigration of Chinese laborers to Outer Mongolia and
have been helping Outer Mongolia with economic aid. They
are well aware that Russian overlordship in that country as well
as in other parts of the Soviet Union has provided a stimulus
for Pan-Mongolian, Pan-Asian and pro-Chinese attitudes.

In addition, soon after the death of Stalin, while a struggle
for power was being fought within the Soviet party, the Chinese
Communists completed their first five-year plan which laid the
basis for China's industrialization and for its future as one of
the leading industrial and military powers in the world. The
Chinese leadership also had an oppo11unity to assert its independence in the field of ideology as well as in the establishment
of the Commune system in the rural parts of China. The commune was to be an institution which would combine agricultural
and industrial production, trade, educational activities, and
military preparedness. It was looked upon as a "great leap
forward" toward Communism and as a proof that Communism
in its pure form ( "to each according to his needs from each
according to his abilities") might be established in China
sooner than in the Soviet Union.
Moreover, Mao Tse-tung's ideas concerning the Chinese
pattern of revolution (guerrilla warfare) based in peasantry
and the Chinese Commune system in the rural areas were looked
upon by the Chinese Communists as being better suited for underdeveloped peasant countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin
America than the Soviet pattern of revolution ( through civil
war or Parliament) and the Soviet agrarian system (Kolkhoz) .
And it was in the control of these vast areas of the world that
the answer lay to the question of who is going to assume the
overlordship of world Communism and of the globe, China or
Russia. In a speech to the Chinese students at the University of
Moscow, November 17, 1957, Mao Tse-tung stated the following:
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The whole world has now a population of 2.7 billion of which the
various socialist countries have nearly one billion; the independent, former colonial countries, more than 700 million; the countries
now struggling for independence or for complete independence,
600 million; and the imperialist camp only about 400 million .. .3'

According to Mao, there are therefore at present 1.3 billion
people ( in Asia, Africa, and Latin America) who have not yet
reached the full capitalist stage of development and are therefore open to infiltration and conquests by Communism, particularly through the instrument of Communist-led "national
liberation movements" and using Chinese revolutionary experiences. In their written and spoken propaganda the Chinese
Communists do not seem to leave much doubt that they believe
these peoples should fall also under the Chinese overlordship.
Thus, for instance, Chou-En-lai, a close associate of Mao, in a
speech on August 20, 1958, said the following:
. . . the peoples of Latin American countries have something in
common with the peoples of Asian and African countries. They
have common aims: to oppose colonialism, to oppose imperialist
aggression and intervention, to demand peace and oppose war, to
press for independent development of the national economy and
emergence from backwardness, in other words ... the peoples of
the countries in Latin America, Asia, and Africa have common
aspirations and demands.3 5

Moreover, there are indications that the Chinese Com•
munists, being the greatest colored nation in the world expect
to have a special appeal along racial lines among the peoples
of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In Latin America their
particular interest seems to be concentrated on Brazil, both
because that country has a high percentage of people of colored
and mixed racial traits and because Brazil is potentially the
most powerful country in Latin America, economically, as well
s4 NCNA, Peking, November 18, 1957.
35 SCMP, No. 1836, p. 40, August 20, 1958. See also Shen-yu Dai, "Peking's Inter•
1
national Position and the Cold War," op. cit.
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as militarily. Including a vast land area and abundant sources of
raw matei-ials, Brazil has all the potentialities for an autarchic
economic system as well as for economic and military control
of other Latin. American counti·ies if led by an aggressive Communist pa11y, under China's guidance.

IV
Such aspirations, however, could not fail to arouse concern
and anxieties in Moscow, heretofore the w1challenged seat of
Communist world power and of Communist dogma. The communist leaders in the Kremlin could not take lightly Peking's
plans for expanding their influence in Asia, Africa, and Latin
America, particularly in view of the possibilities of China becoming economically and militarily one of the leading world
powers in the next couple of decades, possessing atomic
weapons. Moreover the attractive force of Pan-Mongolism and
Pan-Asiatism in Outer Mongolia and among the Mongoloid and
Turco-Mongol peoples in Siberia and Soviet Central Asia would
certainly increase in such circumstances. The Kremlin, therefore, could not possibly fail to answer all these threats to its
leadership in the Communist world, to its territorial gains, and
to its aspirations to the status as the first and mightiest world
power. The Kremlin had to act promptly, therefore, to forestall
the Chinese challenge. The Kremlin's answer came in its new
Party Program. Thus, in the .first place, the Program emphasizes that the Soviet Union is the inspiration and leader of
mankind and as its past as well as future savior, it states :
The gigantic revolutionary exploit accomplished by the Soviet
people roused and inspired the masses in all countries and continents. A mighty purifying thunderstorm marking the springtime
of mankind is raging over the earth . . . The Party regards Communist construction in the U.S.S.R. as the Soviet people's greatest
internationalist task, in keeping with the interests of the international proletariat and all mankind • . .
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The Soviet Union saved mankind from Fascist enslavement . . .
As a result of the devoted labor of the Soviet people and the
theoretical and practical activities of the Communist party of
the Soviet Union, there exists in the world a Socialist society
that is a reality and a science of Socialist construction . . . The
high road to Socialism has been paved. Many peoples are already
marching along it, and it will he taken sooner or later by all
peoples.36

Secondly, the Kremlin in its prog1·am emphasizes the
necessity of all Communist countries to ally economically,
politically, and militarily and to form a unified front against
anti-Communist forces if Socialism is to survive.
The line of Socialist construction in isolation, detached from the
world community of Socialist countries, is theoretically untenable
because it conflicts with the objective laws governing the develop•
ment of Socialist society. It is harmful economically because it
causes waste of social labor, retards the rates of growth of pro•
duction and makes the country dependent upon the capitalist
world. It is reactionary and dangerous politically because it does
not uni te, but divides the peoples in face of the united front of
imperialist forces, because it nourishes bo1irgeois-nationalist tendencies and may ultimately lead to the Toss of the Socialist gains.3 1

Moreover, in its plan to make "within two decades" the
Soviet industry "technologically the best and the strongest in
the world" the Kremlin has conceived a plan according to which
in the Socialist Community of Nations there should develop a
system of economy centered in the Soviet Union and based on
an "international division of labor" and on "technical cooperation . . . coordination of economic plans, specialization, and
combination of production." 38
Such a plan of economic division of labor, regardless of
its merits in terms of economic efficiency, when centered in a
monolithic political regime is likely to promote economic and
36

Program oj the CPSU, op. cit. Part I, Chap. 2.

a1 I bid., Part I, Chap. 3.
38 Ibid.
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political dependency. This kind of integration has already been
in the process of development in the relations between the Soviet
Union and its European satellites. Communist China, on the
other hand, planning to develop its own system of economic
and political integration in the area under its control, has refused to coordinate its economic development with that of Russia
in order to avoid becoming its economic and political dependency.
Thirdly, the Soviet leaders leave no doubt that Communism
will be constructed first of all in the Soviet Union. It will be
built in other Socialist countries "more or less simultaneously,
within the same historical epoch." But it will be the Soviet
Union, "the first country to advance to Communism," that will
"facilitate and accelerate the advance of the entire world
Socialist system to Communism.""0 The Program also insists
that the advance toward Communism could be achieved only
by degrees; not as the Chinese would like to achieve it by
skipping stages in its development.

In addition, according to the Program, particularly great
attention will be paid to the development of the Asian pa1ts of
the Soviet Union, a development which will make the Soviet
Union the greatest Asian power. Says the Program:
The following must be achieved within the next twenty years: in
Siberia and Kazakhstan-the creation of large new power bases
using deposits of cheap coal or the waterpower resources of the
Angara and Yenisei Rivers; the organization of big centers of
power-consuming industries and the completion, in Siberia, of
the country's third metallurgical base; the development of new
rich ore and coal deposits, and the construction of a number of
new large machine-building centers; in Central Asia the rapid
development of ore deposits. The Soviet people will be able to
carry out daring plans to change the courses of some northern
so Ibid., Part IT, Chap. 6.
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rivers and regulate their flow for the purpose of utilizing vast
quantities of water for the irrigation of arid areas.~ 0

Moreover, in addition to exploiting the abundant natural
resources of these regions, they will also be urbanized and
Russified. The non-Russian peoples of this area and their
native cultures are slated for extinction. That industrialization
of these regions has been already used as an instrument of
Russification is confirmed in the Program which states that the
appearance of new industrial centers and the "virgin land"
project "increased the mobility of the population" so much that
the boundaries between the constituent republics of the USSR
are "increasingly losing their former significance." The Program also claims that the full-scale Communist construction
constitutes a new stage in the development of national relations
in the USSR in which the nations will draw still closer together,
until "complete unity is achieved" leading to eventual "effacement of national distinctions, and of language distinctions." 41
That this unity in which national distinctions will be
effaced will mean assimilation of the people of the USSR by
the Russians, follows not only from the existing practices, but
also from the new Party Program which has assigned to the
Russian language a primary civilizing and unifying role.• 2 Expecting considerable resistance to this plan of Russification on
the part of nationalities slated for genocide in the Soviet Union,
as well as on the part of satellite nations scheduled for integration with the Soviet Union, the Program strongly condemns
nationalism which is said to be one of the chief obstacles to
•o 1bid., Part 1, a.
Ibid., Part II, Chap. 4, Concerning Lhe policy of Russification of Asiatic parts
o{ the Soviet Union see Stiulies on. the Soviet Union, op. cit., particularly
A nth"ny Adamovich, "Soviet Colonialism and the National Republics";
llaymirza Hayit, "Turkestan as an Example of Soviet Colonialism"; Andrij
Bilinsky, "Colonialism or Genocide?"; see also Roman Smal-Stocki, The
Captive Nations (New York: 1960).
• 2 Ibid., Part Il, Chap. 4.
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Socialism and Communism and therefore must be fought ruthlessly. When attacking nationalism the Kremlin has also in
mind the tendency of some countries, such as China and Albania, to develop their own "national" or "racial" brand of
Communism. Says the Program:
Nationalism is the chief political and ideological weapon used by
international reaction and the remnants of the domestic reactionary forces against the unity of the socialist countries ... Nationalist prejudice and survivals of former national strife are a
province in which resistance to social progress may be most
protracted and stubborn, bitter and insidious . . . The MarxistLeninist internationalist policy and determined efforts to wipe out
the survivals of bourgeois nationalism and chauvinism are an
important condition for further consolidation of the Socialist
Community.4 3

V
At the 22nd Congress (1961) of the C.P.S.U. the SinoSoviet conflict came to the fore in a dispute over Albania. And
the Albanian question, too, like that of China and Yugoslavia,
illustrates how the ideological differences between the Communist-ruled states are rooted in the vested interests of various
Communist regimes, and in the struggle for power among them.
Albania was not occupied by the Soviet troops at the end
of World War II. But, since 1941 and up to 1948, Albania's
Communist party, as well as Albania's governmental, economic,
and cultural development, were under the guidance of the Communist party of Yugoslavia. 44 The currency of the two countries
was made interchangeable and a customs union was put into
effect. In all Albanian schools, the study of Serb language was
made obligatory, and plans were ready for incorporation of
Albania into Yugoslavia as its seventh republic.••
~a Ibid., Part I, Chap. 3.
"Stavro Skendi, Albania (New York: 1958), pp. 19 ff.
•• Ibid.
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This satellite position of Albania in relation to Yugoslavia
came to an end in 1948 as a result of the break which occurred
in that year between Moscow and Belgrade. The anti-Yugoslav
faction in the Albanian Communist party, backed by the Soviet
Union, rose to power, purged the pro-Tito faction, expelled
Yugoslav experts, advisors, and representatives and brought in
Russian agents instead. Thus Albania rnse from its status of a
dependency of Yugoslavia to that of a satellite of the Soviet
Union. Albania also became a member of the Soviet bloc's
Council for Mutual Economic Aid as well as a member of the
Soviet bloc's Warsaw military treaty in its own right. Such an
achievement enhanced considerably the anti-Yugoslav faction
in the Albanian party led by Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu;
they were credited for "liberation of Albania from the yoke of
Yugoslavia."
However, regardless of Soviet support, deep distrust of
Yugoslav Communists and fear of historical Serb aspirations in
the direction of Albania were not removed from the thoughts
and feelings of the Albanians. After World War I Yugoslavia
incorporated a large section of Albania ethnic territory-now
the autonomous province of Kosmet ( Kosovo-Metohia)-where,
according to Albanian sources, over 850,000 Albanians live,
while the total population in Albania proper is only about
1,4,0 0,000.40 During World War II, the Albanian part of Yugosl av territory became an integral part of Albania, but after the
retreat of Italian and German armies, it was again reincorporated into Yugoslavia by the Yugoslav Communists. Since
1948, the anti-Yugoslav faction of the Albania Communist
party has taken full advantage of this situation, stirring up
irredentist aspirations among the Albania people. In this manner, the Albanian party, presenting itself as a champion of
• 6 United Nations, Demographic Yearbook, 1955, p. 109. According to Rand McNally World Atlas, 1961, the population of Albania is 1,562,000.
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Albanian nationalism, was able to strengthen its hold over the
people.
These feel ings of threat to national interests and to the
national independence of Albania were intensified after Yugoslavia had concluded with Turkey and Greece the Balkan Pact.
It was felt that this military collaboration between Yugoslavia
and Greece might lead toward a renewed pressure on Albania
on the part of Yugoslavia. Moreover there was the possibility
that Greece too might demand an autonomous status for the
Greek minority in southern Albania ( northern Epirus) or to
claim sovereignty over this part of Albanian territory. In such
circumstances the Soviet submarine base in Albania was looked
upon with great favor. The Albanians also saw in the widening
Soviet-Yugoslav conflict (1948-1955) a ray of hope for eventual
incorporation of Kosmet into Albania. And on the ideological
plane Albania became one of the staunchest and most vociferous
exponents of the Sino-Soviet bloc's concerted attack against
"Titoism" and "Yugoslav revisionism."
Not unlike the Yugoslav and the Chinese party leaderships,
the Albanian party core is still composed of the same people
who took part in the formation of the Albanian Communist
party in 1941, in the subsequent guerrilla warfare, and in the
seizure of power in 1944. From the point of view of religious
background the leading core of the Albanian party is predominantly Moslem. It could also be considered predominantly intellectual in terms of Albanian educational standards and
predominantly of middle class origin in terms of Albania's
social structure.41 In the latter aspects, as well as in its revolutionary origin, and power-oriented fanaticism, the Albanian
leadership is similar to the Chinese party leadership. Both have
imbibed nationalistic attitudes in the course of their schooling
' 7

See "Biographical Sketches" of Albanian Communist Leaders in Stavro Skendi,
op. cit., pp. 323-45.
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and both tend to be orthodox Leninists in the sense that they
believe that world tension, revolutionary activities, and warfare
would enhance their internal and external objectives.
The ethnic origin of Albanian leadership i s almost exclusively Tosk-the ethnic group inhabiting the southern Albanian regions. The northern Albanians- the Geg ethnic group
which is still organized in the form of a tribal system- had
provided Albanian leadership before the seizure of power by
the sout11erners. The Gegs therefore tend to resent the dominance
of the Task people and the imposition of the Tosk dialect as the
official language of the country .• 8 The Geg tribes, however, are
trnditionally anti-Yugoslav, particularly anti-Serb, since it is
the Geg Albanians who live across the borders in Yugoslavia
under the Serb national hegemony. The animosity between the
two national grnups dates far back into history owing to an
age-long contest over the same territory. Accordingly, the Albanian Communist leaders have used their anti-Yugoslav campaign since 1948 also as an instrument of national unification
between the No11h and South, and as a means of weakening the
opposition of the Geg population to Tosk leadership.
It is therefore understandable that the rapprochement of
the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia since 1955, as well as the
"peaceful coexistence" theme put forward at the 20th Congress
of the CPSU in 1956, were looked upon by the Albanian Communist leaders as ill-omened events. Not only were these happenings considered to be a blow to the national aspirations of
the Albanians, but they brought back the specter of the Yugoslav
Communist party once again taking over the reins of Albanian
political, economic, and cultural life, and purging all antiYugoslavs in the Albanian party. It was at this point, when both
personal power and national survival were in question, that the
•s A. R. V. Burks, The Dynamics of Communism in Ea.stem Europe (Princeton:
1961), pp. 144-48.
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Albanian Communists began to look at Communist China as
their ally and protector. Since Communist China was in the
meantime organizing within the Communist camp resistance
against the Soviet leadership and its "revisionism," the switch
of Albanian allegiance was not only welcomed by the Chinese
but they also suppo1ted and encouraged the anti-Kremlin stand
of the Albanians. And when the Kremlin attempted to reverse
this trend of development with the help of a few pro-Russian
leaders in the Albanian pa1ty, these were promptly purged hy
the Hoxha-Shehu pro-Peking faction.
The Soviet leaders, on the other hand, not wanting to risk
an open break with China over ideological and other issues, used
Albania as a "whipping boy" to demonstrate their displeasure
and their anger concerning the behavior of the Chinese Communists. This was done, as is well known, by Khrushchev in a
dramatic way at the 22nd Congress of the Communist party in
the Soviet Union in 1961, when he publicly castigated the Albanian leaders for their "dogmatism," "sectarianism," and
"cult of personality," as a justification for expulsion of Albania
from the Soviet bloc. The Chinese representative at the Congress, Chou En-lai, however, rose in defense of Albania and
publicly denounced the way the Russians were treating a "fraternal Communist patty" in contradiction to the 1957 Moscow
Declaration of Ruling Communist Patties, according to which
"the Socialist countries base their relations on principles of
complete equality . . . and noninterference in one another's
affairs," a principle which was stated again in the 1960 Moscow
statement of 81 Communist patties, as well as in the new Program of the CPSU. Thus by defending the Albanians, the
Chinese Communists emphasized publicly also their own right
to challenge any one-sided decisions made in the Kremlin on
the questions which are of direct concern to the rest of the
Communist world.
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VI
It seems clear from the preceding account of events in the
Sino-Soviet orbit that the struggle for power and conflict of
vested interests has brought about a certain degree of disintegration of Kremlin-centered monolithism. But will this trend of
development necessarily lead toward a break in the Sino-Soviet
alliance and eventually toward open hostilities between two
Communist worlds, the Western and the Eastern?
It appears that the Communist global strategy as viewed
from the Kremlin envisages several zones, centered in the Soviet
Union and expanding to encompass the whole earth, each one
of them having a special function to perform in a plan of world
conquest. Thus the role of the satellite states, immediately adjoining the Soviet Union, is to strengthen "the base of world
revolution" through an economic, cultural, and military integration with the Soviet Union. This bloc of closely united
countries would form an impenetrable bastion of Communist
ideological and material strength. The Communist-ruled countries which are outside of this inner core, such as Yugoslavia,
China, and eventually Albania, would form a link between the
Soviet bloc and that of the "neutral" and underdeveloped countries ( " national democracies") in which "national liberation
movements" and "popular front" tactics would be use<l to ease
the Communist seizure of power, as it has been done earlier in
Eastern Europe. In some cases this process might be of short
duration, such as it has happened in Cuba; in others it might
be rather slow> such as, for instance, in the Arab world.

In contrast to this view, the CommWlist global strategy, as
seen from Peking, envisages an emphasis on immediate worldwide revolutionary activities, led by the Communist-oriented
groups, primarily in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and
backed by abundant military aid on the pa.it of all the existing
Communist-ruled countries particularly the Soviet Union. In
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this view a speed-up of a violent seizure of power by means of
guerrilla warfare or military intervention, is of paramount impo1tance before the nascent anti-Communist bourgeoisies en•
trench themselves and perpetuate their rule. South Vietnam, for
instance, is a case in point. At the same time the Chinese Com•
munist leaders, as it was shown earlier, see China and its own
ring of satellite states as the bastion of Communism and as a
center of attraction and overlordship for a communized Asia,
Africa, and Latin America.
Thus looking at the Sino-Soviet relations from the point of
view of expectations of the leaderships of the two major pa1ties,
the present cl ispute between them might seem insoluble and
eventual open hostilities inevitable. Yet in addition to the ruling
pa1ties, there is another influential and growing class in con•
temporary Communist societies, as mentioned earlier. This is
the class of government bureaucrats, technocrats, managers, and
other experts who possess the know-how and are of paramount
importance from the point of view of the survival of a complex
totalitarian system. These technological intelligentsia have to
be paid handsomely for their indispensable services. They have
been already accumulating income and privileges, status and
power. They have also been developing a vested interest of their
own in the Communist system as well as a class consciousness
and an esprit de corps on the international Communist level.
Thus defending its common interests, this " new class" has become a unifying agent among Communist powers, exerting a
counter-influence on disintegrating trends.
In addition, the Communist parties and pro-Communist
groups outside the camp of Communist states, to which the
growing strength of world Communism is a main source of inspiration, of energy, of morale, and of fanatical belief in the
inevitability of the spread of Communist power over the globe,
are exerting great pressure in the direction of unity, understanding, and common policies among the Communist powers.
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Since these parties and groups are important to both the Soviet
Union and China as arms of their foreign policies, their opinions
and attitudes cannot be entirely neglected.
Moreover, there is a possibility that a new generation of
youths will be growing up raised in the Chinese Communes and
in the Soviet "boarding schools," away from the influences of
parental homes. Could it be that these young people, devoid of
human warmth of the family circle and exposed to constant
drilling of Communist ideologists and coldness of Communist
barracks, will grow as New Janissaries, fanatic and fierce, and
eager to spread the Communist faith by sword and nuclear
bomb against the infidel bourgeoisies of the non-Communist
world? Or will they destroy themselves in a war of extermination between rival heresies?
Thus it should be remembered that while there are conflicts of interest between the parties of the Sino-Soviet orbit, they
also have common aims, and the ideology of inevitability of
Communist triumph on earth is imperative for the success of all.
If this is so, then as long as there is "a world to win" 40 there is
no reason to suppose that all the Communist powers should not
continue to be united at least under formal Soviet leadership.
And if they are split into Moscow-centered and Peking-centered
blocs, they might still divide among themselves the "spheres of
interests" and form a durable association for global conquest.

•o Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, Chap. IV.
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